UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-23-2009

State v. Eldred Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34718

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Eldred Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34718" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1951.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1951

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

NO. 34718

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
SHARON KAY ELDRED,
Defendant-Appellant.

FILED- COPY

______________ )

MAR 2 3 2009
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

' Supreme Court _Court of Appeals_

i_

Entered on ATS by:

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON

HONORABLE GORDON W. PETRIE
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

HEATHER M. CARLSON
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

REBEKAH A. CUDE
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 21
APPENDIX A

ii

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) .......................................................... 6

iv

Eldred said something unintelligible to Mr. Jones, shut her door, re-started her
car, and left the parking lot, running over some flower beds on her way. (Trial
Tr., p.54, Ls.13-17, p.57, L.1 - p.58, L.15.) Mr. Jones again followed Eldred in
his car, re-contacting the 911 dispatcher to update law enforcement on Eldred's
route.

(Trial Tr., p.58, L.16 - p.59, L.21.)

Mr. Jones continued to observe

Eldred's erratic driving as she drove from Nampa to Middleton, where she pulled
up to a house, got out of her car and walked into the house. (Trial Tr., p.59, L.2 p.67, L.5.)
At about the same time, Canyon County Sheriffs Office Corporal
Chamberlain arrived, parked and called to Eldred, "sheriffs department" several
times as Eldred continued to walk toward and into the house. (Trial Tr., p.66,
L.12 - p.67, L.18, p.96, L.1 - p.100, L.13.)

Corporal Chamberlain followed

Eldred into the house and found her sitting in a chair.
p.102, L.7.)

(Trial Tr., p.101, L.1 -

After speaking with Eldred and noting the odor of an alcoholic

beverage coming from her, as well as observing her glossy and red eyes and
slurred speech, Corporal Chamberlain asked Eldred to perform field sobriety
evaluations. (Trial Tr., 103, L.17- p.108, L.25.) After escorting Eldred out of the
house, Corporal Chamberlain attempted to perform the horizontal gaze
nystagmus but could not get Eldred to stop leaning against her car and stand in
the beginning position for the test.

(Trial Tr., p.110, Ls.4-23.)

As Corporal

Chamberlain repeatedly tried to administer the field sobriety evaluations, Eldred
failed to comply with the instructions and became argumentative.
p.110, Ls.12-22.)

(Trial Tr.,

When Corporal Chamberlain attempted to place her in
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ISSUE
Eldred states the issue on appeal as:
Did the State violate Ms. Eldred's right to a fair trial, guaranteed by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, by
committing multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct during the
closing arguments?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Eldred failed to show error, much less fundamental error, in relation to the
prosecutor's closing arguments?

4

evidence" or "implicate[s] other specific rights of the accused such as the right to
counsel or the right to remain silent." Jg.,_ at 181-82.
However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis
of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must
be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the
prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial." United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider the probable effect that the
prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's ability to judge the evidence
fairly." Jg.,_ at 11-12.
With respect to prosecutorial misconduct in the context of closing
argument the United States Supreme Court has stated:
Isolated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to
the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the
same proportions. Such arguments, like all closing arguments of
counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event;
improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and
meaning less than crystal clear. While these general observations
in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a
court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an
ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a
jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from
the plethora of less damaging interpretations.
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974).
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of
reviewing closing arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that "in
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep
in mind the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273,
285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33
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Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error if it
is calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or
prejudice against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the
jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the
evidence.
More specifically, prosecutorial misconduct during
closing arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the
comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent
prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial
court informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded.
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003) (citations,
quotations, and brackets omitted).
Application of the foregoing standards to Eldred's claims of prosecutorial
misconduct reveals she has failed to establish error, much less fundamental
error.

D.

None Of The Prosecutor's Statements Eldred Complains Of Were
Improper, Much Less So Egregious Or Inflammatory That Any
Consequent Prejudice Could Not Have Been Cured By A Curative
Instruction
Eldred claims the prosecutor struck "multiple foul blows" that "amounted to

fundamental error."

(Appellant's brief, pp.5, 7.)

The comments that Eldred

complains of were not improper, much less "foul blows" or misconduct amounting
to fundamental error. All of Eldred's misconduct claims lack merit.
1.

The Prosecutor Did Not Misstate The Burden Of Proof, Express
Her Own Belief In Eldred's Guilt Or Make An Impermissible
Reference To The "Cloak Of Innocence"

Eldred claims the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof, impermissibly
expressed her personal opinion regarding Eldred's guilt and imperrnissibly
referred to the "cloak of innocence" being lifted. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) All of
these claims fail, as the prosecutor's statements were proper. The comments
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The authority from other jurisdictions relied on by Eldred is largely
unsupportive of her claim in this case. In People v. Brooks, 803 N.E.2d 626 (Ill.
App. 2004), for example, the prosecutor simply told the jury, without reference to
the evidence or having met his burden of proof, that the "cloak of innocence is
gone."

803 N.E.2d at 630.

The Appellate Court of Illinois condemned the

remarks of the prosecutor in part because "the argument did not indicate that
after hearing the evidence the defendant was no longer cloaked in innocence."
803 N.E.2d at 630 (emphasis supplied).

In doing so, it distinguished the

comments made by Brooks' prosecutor with those made by the prosecutor in
People v. Cisewski, 514 N.E.2d 970 (Ill. 1987). In that case, the Supreme Court
of Illinois found no error in the prosecutor's closing statement that "[n]ow is the
time, Ladies and Gentlemen, to remove the cloak of innocence from this
defendant ... ,", in large part because it considered the prosecutor's comments in
their entirety and noted that, immediately prior to making this statement, the
prosecutor exhorted the jury to "consider all of the evidence .... "

514 N.E.2d at

977. See also People v. Weatherspoon, 637 N.E.2d 651, 657 (Ill. App. 1994)
("The record read in its entirety shows the prosecutor committed no error by
relating to the jury that although every defendant comes

to trial cloaked with a

presumption of innocence, the evidence presented in this case lowered the cloak
to reveal defendant committed the crimes at issue.").

prosecutor's comment could be misconstrued by a jury ... any ambiguity could
easily have been remedied on objection by a clarification from the trial court.
Thus, we will not consider this issue further.").
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discussing the evidence the state had presented that satisfied its burden. (Trial
Tr., p.218, L.24 - p.225, L.24.) The prosecutor's statements were not improper
or misconduct.
Eldred next claims that the prosecutor's statement, in the same set of
remarks, that "Eldred is guilty" is an improper expression of her own belief in
Eldred's guilt.

(Appellant's brief, p.9.)

However, Idaho law is clear that a

prosecutor may make such a statement when it is based upon the evidence.
State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 753 n.1, 810 P.2d 680, 691 n.1 (1991),

overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081
(1991). The Idaho Supreme Court further cautioned prosecutors making such a
statement to take care to avoid interjecting their own personal belief, and "should
explicitly state that the opinion is based solely on inferences from evidence
presented at trial."

Id.

The prosecutor in Eldred's case did just that, first

providing the context that the state had the burden to prove Eldred's guilt by the
presentation of evidence, then stating that it had been so proven, and
immediately discussing the evidence that established Eldred's guilt.
p.218, L.12 - p.226, L.19.)

(Trial Tr.,

As with the prosecutor's much more emphatic

statements in State v. Wolfrum, 145 Idaho 44, 175 P.3d 206 (Ct. App. 2007) ("If
this man is not convicted of perjury, who can be?"), "[n]ot only are the
prosecutor's statements not fundamental error, they are non-objectionable."
Wolfrum, 145 Idaho at 49, 175 P.3d at 211.
Finally, Eldred claims that the prosecutor's statements regarding its
burden of proof are improper. More particularly, Eldred claims the prosecutor's
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discussion of the state's burden in State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 75
P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003): "Romero-Garcia has failed to persuade this Court that
any misconduct occurred. The prosecutor reiterated what the district court had
already instructed - that the state bears the burden of proving every element
beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant has no obligation to present
evidence."

Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho at 203, 75 P.3d at 1213.

See also

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 n.15 (1986) (comments that lead the
jury to minimize the importance of its role are improper, but where "[i]f anything,
the prosecutors' comments would have had the tendency to increase the jury's
perception of its role," no error). The prosecutor in Eldred's case emphasized
that the presumption of innocence was significant and that the state alone has
the burden of presenting evidence to remove that presumption. The prosecutor
did not engage in misconduct. Eldred's claim fails.
2.

The Prosecutor Did Not Misrepresent The Evidence

Eldred claims that the prosecutor, in her rebuttal closing argument,
"misrepresented the evidence" when she said that Eldred "refused to blow" when
the officer administered the BAC test.

(Appellant's brief, p.9.)

Because the

prosecutor was entitled to discuss the evidence presented at trial, and the
reasonable inferences that can be derived from that evidence, the prosecutor did
not engage in misconduct by these statements. Eldred's claim fails.
Eldred's closing argument put forth two theories: first, that her erratic
driving was due to her fright at being followed by Mr. Jones, and second, that her
.264 BAC was artificially high because the printout from the lntoxilyzer 5000
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And why? Because she didn't want to blow properly. She
refused to blow properly.
He would start to get the tone, and then it would drop off.
(Trial Tr., p.233, L.15 - p.234, L.14.) Deputy Chamberlain testified that when he
and his backup first attempted to place Eldred under arrest, "she became
combative." (Trial Tr., p.110, Ls.12-23.) Deputy Chamberlain testified that later,
when Eldred was asked to blow into the mouthpiece of the lntoxilyzer 5000, "she
was attempting to blow, but she was doing an exaggerated, you know, cheeks
puffed out. It looked like she was blowing extremely hard, but the machine was
indicating to me that it was not receiving." (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.20-23.)
The prosecutor's statements were a fair discussion of the testimony and
the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. As the Idaho Supreme Court
has made clear, "[b]oth sides have traditionally been afforded considerable
latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their
respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom."
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003).

The

prosecutor's statements discussing Corporal Chamberlain's observations of
Eldred's efforts at providing a breath sample, and the inferences to be drawn
therefrom, were not improper and did not constitute misconduct. Eldred's claim
fails.
3.

The Prosecutor Did Not lmpermissibly Appeal To The Jurors'
Emotions

Eldred claims that the state attempted to appeal to the juror's emotions
and urged the jury to convict Eldred "because she could have injured or killed

16

She finally takes the Garrity exit, and he stops her, he and
another car, another citizen, don't even know who he is. He is just
another average citizen like Mr. Jones. Please, please take the
keys out of the ignition and put them on the dashboard, and let us
get you help.
What is her reaction? She guns it, drives over a flower bed
at the Wal-Mart, and gets back out on the road.
She slams on her brakes, throws the car in reverse, and
comes flying backwards, and then starts driving again.
And at this point as she drives down Garrity and it turns into
Can-Ada, there are cars swerving out of the way to miss being hit
by Ms. Eldred.
She finally stops in Middleton, reaches down to get
something and almost falls, gets back into her car and drives to Mr.
Ashby's house.
All of this time, the defense would have you believe she is
scared. It is that fear that is making her drive in a manner that
could kill somebody.
(Trial Tr., p.220, L.3 - p.221, L.23.) By this argument, the prosecutor is clearly
referencing Mr. Jones' testimony that he believed he was saving lives by calling
911, putting on his flashers to alert other drivers, and following Eldred until law
enforcement could locate her, as well as his testimony that her driving had
endangered others

on the road. (Trial Tr., p.47, L.20 - p.49, L.10, p.50, L.3 -

p.52, L.5, p.59, L.4 - p.62, L.10.) It was not improper for the prosecutor to refer
to this evidence during closing argument. See Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77
P.3d at 969 (the parties "are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective
standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom") (citation
omitted).
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should decline to consider her arguments. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263,
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.").
Even if this Court considers Eldred's claim of fundamental error, because
she has failed to establish any error, she has necessarily failed to establish
fundamental error. Even if this Court finds some of the prosecutor's arguments
were improper, Eldred has failed to articulate any basis for concluding the
arguments were so egregious or inflammatory that "any consequent prejudice
could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury
that the comments should be disregarded." Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d
at 969.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Eld red's conviction.
DATED this 23 rd day of March, 2009.

Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

STATE OF IDAHO vs. SHARON K. ELDRED
MS. KALLIN:

1

2

4
5

8
10

Permission to walk about the

well'
THE COURT: Certainly.
MS. KALLIN: Ladies and gentlemen, I want to
start by thanking you again. I'm sure that each and
every one of you have other things that you would rather
be doing this last day and a half, rather than sitting
in this little courtroom in those chairs. I appreciate
your attentiveness to the facts in this case, and I 1m
sure that Ms. Eldred also appreciates you listening

Middleton, multiple streets in the town of Middleton,
2 ultimately ending up on Hawthorne,

1

3
4
5
6
8

9

10

11

11

12
13

12
13
14

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

25

~tl1}~·;"·~

''

22
23
24
25

Idaho.

220

218
Two times that would be .16.

rnree times the legal limit would be ,24.
Ms. Eldred - .264. Over three times the
legal limit,
~;-.,w, J1.1t1ge Petrie has given you some
instructions with regards to the elements I have to
7 prove. I would like to take a minute and go through

3

8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
11
18
19
20
21
22
23
,_.,

each of those elements.

That on or about May 5, 2001, we have heard
testimony from every witness that May 5, 2001 is the day
we are talking about, in the state of Idaho.
Officer Chamberlain testified that it did, in
fact, happen in the State of Idaho.
And, for that fact, while the driving may
have started in Ada County, it finished in Canyon
County.
You will remember Mr. Jones' testimony,
David Jones, going from Cole to the interstate, and
driving from the Cole exit behind Ms. Eldred all the way
to the Garrity exit.
And then there is a brief stint at the
Wal-Mart at that new exit.
Then she gets in her car again, and she
.!.!.iVd ,.i.t,,1;::
••• i:~-,:!11:...

1

Ga.rrity as it turns into Can-Ada 1 she goes
:.H:i::: yoes into Middleton, drives around

t.:r:...•¥,

21,
A'--= u..s ..: :_ ;. . - ~,,, ,
Case NO. CR-U/-1113O
Docket No. 34718

6 Cl
_.... 0it"and"'puittli~-bti2 tli~C(,
1 .Piil,
8 'i~t'.\s;,~~1?y,M'lielp'. ' · ·
9

10
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1

11

12
13
14

19
20
21
22
23
24
,5

tqget something and 'almost falls/ gets 'back lrito her '/
c~r'and
tH''i,i't'Yfsiii\'y"shouse··.·.
.
· Ail of this ti~e, the defense would have you
believe she is scared, It is that fear that is making
her drive in a manner that could kill somebody.
It. is that. i2ar that. is uto.kiny nc!. :.J..r~ve _,; a.
manner t1,ot is !!c:, ..ic,; r.cr s,;ervc ·,ct "' .... , ... , _ o .. s

drives

STATE OF IDAHO vs. SHARON K. ELDRED

----------:-:---:-,----,--,-----::-:-,---,-----,-,--,

1 from Dave Laycock at the state lab, .26 is approximately
12 drinks in the average body at the time of the test.
Does this look like what we are talking
4 about?
5
Mr. Laycock went on to say how those drinks
6 got there.
7
We don't know. We don't know. We don't know
8 how much she drank that day. We don't know how much she
9 had before she got in her car and got on the.interstate,
10 and backed up traffic a half mile back.
11
What we do know is that she certainly never
12 had time to consume that drink. And even if she had,
13 this is not the result we would have.
2
J

14
15

Ladies and gentlemen, each and every one
of you came into court today with your conman sense,

16
11
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

You didn't leave it in your car, and you didn't leave
it back in the jury room. I am asking that each and
every one of you use that conunon sense, and find
Ms. Eldred guilty of driving under the influence.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Ms. Reynolds.
MS. REYNOLDS: Permission to move about the
well'
THE COURT: Sure.
MS. REYNOLDS: Jury members, I know it's been

3

0

;p;~)t;f.,M~.~.:~::-;.f.?;-.·.&_.~-;g1,·me·,,~,,~.-.ie.t}.'l.5'½±~~~B:T-Ji;~\~.: t closelji~f&ift,
20 "'Ee'1\l!llinq'Jl:lreJi,}wmili'
f"1il!ey~'.'iian'.tedf and Billowing her, and
21 following her. And then parking outside the house when
22 she arrives at a safe place, and remaining outside the
23 house for some time.
24
When asked, Mr. Jones did not recall any
25 smell of intoxicating substance coming from Ms. Eldred
19

226
1
2
3
4
5
6

228

a long couple o.f days. I know you are tired and want to
go home, but I'm glad you came. I'm glad you paid
attention during the whole trial, and I hope you make
the right decision today.
My closing statement will make reference to
various facts admitted .into eyidence...and ,t,estified to.

1 when he had contact with Ms. Eldred.
2
He did not testify he saw beer cans or vodka
3 bottles rolling around the car.
4
He did not testify as to any potential
5 intoxicating substance that she had on her person, in
6 her car, on her breath 1 anything along those lines.

'the best of my ability and my recollection. If your

7
8
9

r~~~mkiiiiiii¥i'kg£4,)~.~fif~?k6~rt·~h~X~i~Jiri-~~~'.i~t~-~~-f' to

8=
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
11

recollection is different from mine 1 please use your own

recollection.
We have heard testimony from all the
witnesses today and the last couple of days, and it is
up to you as jury members to determine their
credibility. As individual persons, you know how
to determine credibility. You know when someone is
telling the truth, and when someone is a good or bad
witness.
Our first witness was Mr. Jones.

~ll?J~~~f'

rtf~ij~\l.~i#f
23
24
25

He said this took two hours, a two-hour drive'

4 for this 18 miles to happen.
5
He also testified that there was a procession
6 of cars almost a mile long behind this car with flashing
1 lights, and everyone was staying back. Yet, somehow in
8 this two-hour interval, not one police officer showed up
until she arrived at the other house.
10
I hope that makes you think about Mr. Jones'
11 credibih tt:1®1fi'1;,ii:Mfilolifl~~,:ii;/jlllJ!lt;~b~~:\¥,¥{~'!,~ft~·
."'.".'O''·'·i:t·.·.·~r.!J.·it.· ~ § ~ . ~ _ , .. r,.,.,. ,..c·"·-,?-;,,,0,. ,,·,.-':r,., i-·.r,u,etc..,,··-.12 '·,¢;.•
13 ,, ... ·, ...,, Additionally, Mr. Jones could not understand
14 why someone would be terrified that a car was following
15 a driver for 1 I guess, two hours for the entire drive
16 through this small town of Middleton with the twists and
17 turns to get through the residential streets. He could
18 not understand why my client, Ms. Eldred, would be

. II(i~1tti~::1i!i~t;i;~{~;;~it:J';;j:;');J·

Mr. Jones proceeded to tell us that he
followed a car, staying one to two car-lengths behind it

l0&U~1~$~[t'f~til.&¾tli~t~JW,fil)!~£,9R:/JJ!£~£)l~k!l'~t
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10
11

12
13

14
15
16
11
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

1
CQ!~ii;if
ill\:;f
f
t
~
r
: ' .. :,
p{o~iilily ·draw from your· 0111: "*P"~l~nte:•{~l\1{~11\,ihe
>Ci,,c~~~'tiV'

a8aafu~~&f¥~fh,f.~~-~~:~3/~'.~~:~,.~~~g;;f_~it~,{~~

Mr. Ashby did testify that Ms. Eldred's car
wasn't running very well. That he had difficulty
navigating it when he drove it.
Mr. Ashby, who does know my client well, he
testified that she appeared sober when she arrived,
although terrified. She was terrified. She was asking
him about the car that was following her. She wanted to
know if it had connections with the break-ins a: ;;.,:r
house,

To calm her nerves, Mr. Ashby poured a coffee
cup, that we have all been looking at, the coffee cup of
vodka, which she pro~tly consumed to soothe her nerves,

to calm her down.
Mr. Ashby testified that roughly 10 to 15
minutes later, the officer showed up at the house.
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1

2 de~~s%~~;i~~~~~;~G~:~fh~;_:.i1gd"~!f~~!f;~~~~:?:1e
3
4

5
6
7

no"ti\'a'it:accuz:ate

lS

tead~ng;

That's not the testimony I heard, And, in
fact, that 1 s not consistent to what is printed on
the breath slip, A deficient sanq,le is highest

2

3
4 inq,lied, lam going to tell you right now -- whoever the
5 person is, the alternate juror drawn, that gets to leave
6 now1 still may not discuss this case with anyone else or
7
8

8

9

10
11

12

·,9iff,;;~:);Jan 't~f ~~f'tiiE! tong;

13

14
15

s·"'•Jieynolds is right, though.

16
17

any signs of alcohol in her car.
Are there signs of alcohol in cars when

18
19
20
21
22

people go to the bar to drink?
Are there signs when people drink at their
house?
We don 1 t know how much she drank 1 and we
don 1 t know how it got there?

24
25

the influence on May 5, 2007.
And Ms. Reynolds talked some about the tape,

There was not

What we do k.now is that she was driving under

Does she sound like a .26, or is her tolerance
something that Ms. Reynolds asked multiple witnesses
about?

Is her tolerance at a level that she can

function at a .26'
The law sinq,ly says if you are above a .08,
you are under the influence of alcohol.
Ladies and gentlemen, beyond a reasonable

17
18

doubt does not mean beyond all doubt, Nothing can be
proven beyond all doubt. But this case is sinq,ly beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Beyond a reasonable doubt, she was driving
under the influence on that day.
Beyond a reasonable doubt, she is guilty of
that crime, Thank you,
THE COURT: Thank you, Madam Clerk, at this
time I am going to ask you to draw one number, This is
the Court's version of a lottery, and this is the deal:
You are going to coordinate with the bailiff on where

16

19

you can be contacted, whoever the individual is whose

20

number is drawn, hopefully you have a hard line number

21
22
23

and a cell phone number, or at least one of those 1 so
that we can contact you to say, You know 1 one of those
strange events have happened, and we need to have you

24
25

come back and help this jury decide the case because one
of the jurors had to go home sick - heaven forbid - but
235
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form or express an opinion about this matter, or decide

the case until we give you the call,
9
That 1 s why we need your nuroher 1 so we can
10 call you right away and say, We have a verdict and this
11 was the verdict.
12
When you get that call, then you can say,
13 Hey, honey, guess what I have been doing the last two
14 days. Alright' Until you get that call, don't be
15 saying, Hey, honey, about anything that was going on.
16 Alright'
17
You say 1 Hey, honey, how come you didn 1 t mow
18 the lawn'
19
Does that make sense?
20
I wish I had a drum roll, Madam Clerk, will
21 you draw the number.
22
THE CLERK: 133,
23
THE COURT: 133, Wait, wait, You will yet
24 some parting gifts from the bailiff before you leave.
25
Now, the rest of you, you are going to go
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some circumstance like that. That 1 s why we have the
alternate juror in case there is an emergency.
S0 1 implied in that -- in fact, it 1 s not
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back to the jury room to deliberate,
You will have at the outset those two
exhibits that are there at the witness 1 stand.

We have the other exhibit out here, So,
Madam Clerk, we will need to lock the door.
And if you need to hear that recording -- in
fact, I 1m going to have you take possession of that so

that if they need to hear that recording, let us know
and we will all come back here,
So the bailiff will have possession of that
exhibit, you will have the other two, the paper
exhibits, if you will, plus the verdict form, and the
official pen for recording your decision.

You will also have the instructions that
I just gave you, sinq,ly called, Instructions to the
Jury.
And then way back yesterday, if you can
remember back that far -- I have difficulty with that,
maybe you can -- the general instructions, And you will
say, We heard those, Judge.
Well, that's right, but general instruction 3
had the definition of reasonable doubt. You can review
them all if you want, but the one for purposes of
deliberation that you may find useful is the instruction
on what the standard is for reasonable doubt.
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